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COUNTERTERRORISM
Some 120 U.S. chemical plants are potentially vulnerable to a terrorist attack, and are beginning to take measures to reduce that peril, the American Chemistry Council said last week. These plants are among some 2,000 facilities operated by ACC's 165 member companies. The facilities were identified on the basis of terrorist vulnerability assessments conducted last year by the companies themselves. By year-end, these 120 facilities must undertake measures to increase security, and within three more months, third-party auditors must certify that the facilities are in compliance with their self-assessments. These requirements are part of an ACC-run plant security program, which the association created as an alternative to federal regulations. A similar program is operated by the Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association for its 320 member companies. The chemical plant self-assessment results are confidential, and neither ACC nor SOCMA will provide even general information about the sites, such as their locations or what actions companies might take to reduce their vulnerability. The small number of companies cited indicates that the lion's share of ACC facility operators believe they have a low probability of being affected by a terrorist attack. The association-crafted assessment programs are the only chemical industry security requirements, and they affect only a small slice of the more than 15,000 U.S. companies that handle large amounts of potentially dangerous chemicals. Although the Department of Homeland Security and EPA have said they will require chemical companies to conduct vulnerability assessments and take protective steps, they have yet to develop regulations or bill language. Brian Roehrkasse, a DHS spokesman, says it is unclear if legislation is even necessary or which agency would oversee such a program. Roehrkasse points out that DHS is but three months old and deeply involved in a process to assess vulnerabilities of all the nation's critical infrastructures. Chemical plants, he adds, are "a top priority" because of their contribution to the U.S. economy and because they are potential targets for a terrorist attack. Meanwhile, Roehrkasse explains, DHS is working to establish a communications network between itself and chemical companies to share terrorism information. Called the Chemical-Sector Information Sharing & Analysis Center (ISAC), this fledgling network is one of a dozen industrial-sector ISACs. It was announced last April, and it is run by ACC's Chemtrec, a 24-hour emergency communications center. ISAC transmits security information among 460 industry participants and the National Infrastructure Protection Center, a multiagency federal intelligence operation housed in DHS. ISAC works like this: When the government announced a Code Orange threat in February, ISAC quickly notified its network of subscribers, including chemical trade associations, state chemical councils, companies, and individuals. Although industry officials strongly support ISAC, they say they want the alerts to provide more information. "ISAC is probably the most critical piece of the whole puzzle," says Tim Scott, global director of emergency services and security for Dow Chemical. But, he notes, some of the ISAC information is "pretty soft," and it is unclear what a company is supposed to do with it.
"You can't build up a defense and maintain an invulnerable wall of security every day, forever." Tim Scott,
Chemtrec's Tim Butters, who runs the chemical ISAC, says he and government officials are exploring adding more substance to alerts as well as more subscribers to the ISAC network. But ISAC is a general warning system, he notes, and recently, when a terrorist threat was pinpointed to a chemical company, ISAC was bypassed and federal officials went straight to the company. |
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