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Assessment of the Trust Crisis between Upstream and Downstream States of the Helmand River Basin (1973–2022): A Half-Century of Optimism or Cynicism?
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Assessment of the Trust Crisis between Upstream and Downstream States of the Helmand River Basin (1973–2022): A Half-Century of Optimism or Cynicism?
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  • Najibullah Loodin*
    Najibullah Loodin
    Water Management and Hydrological Science Program, College of Arts and Sciences, Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas 77843, United States
    *[email protected]
    More by Najibullah Loodin
    Orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0003-0301-5868
  • Gabriel Eckstein
    Gabriel Eckstein
    Texas A&M University School of Law, Fort Worth, Texas 76102, United States
    More by Gabriel Eckstein
  • Vijay P. Singh
    Vijay P. Singh
    Department of Biological and Agricultural Engineering and Zachry Department of Civil & Environmental Engineering, Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas 77843, United States
    More by Vijay P. Singh
  • Rosario Sanchez
    Rosario Sanchez
    Texas Water Resources Institute, Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas 77843, United States
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ACS ES&T Water

Cite this: ACS EST Water 2023, 3, 6, 1654–1668
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https://doi.org/10.1021/acsestwater.2c00428
Published March 13, 2023

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Abstract

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Building trust is the foundation for reliable and sustainable cooperation between upstream and downstream riparians of a shared watercourse. This research aimed to assess the challenges of trust building between upstream Afghanistan and downstream Iran on the Helmand River. Given the rapid climatic changes and the high demand for water use due to increases in population and agricultural expansion in the basin, this research argues that both nations failed to fully implement the 1973 Helmand River Treaty, which has eroded opportunities to build trust between the two riparians. Also, the paper asserts that by prioritizing national security interests over transboundary interests and by implementing a one-sided data sharing approach in practice, both Iran and Afghanistan created significant challenges for the establishment of trust between them. The paper concludes that to establish a long-lasting trust between the two neighboring states, both countries should hold themselves responsible for and committed to cooperation through a proper data sharing mechanism.

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Note Added after ASAP Publication

This paper orginally published ASAP on March 13, 2023. A citation was removed in the last paragraph before section 6b. A new version reposted on June 9, 2023.

Synopsis

The findings of the paper highlight that if both nations, Afghanistan and Iran, commit to the Helmand River Treaty and proper data sharing, transboundary trust will be increased between the upstream and downstream states of the Helmand River Basin.

1. Introduction

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Currently, more than 310 transboundary river basins cover approximately half of the world’s land surface. (1) Shared by 150 countries, these international watercourses contain approximately 60% of all the water flowing in rivers and lakes worldwide supporting more than 50% of the world’s population. (2,3) Gerlak et al. (4) believe that, except for most island nations, nearly every country on the globe has at least one transboundary waterway flowing across its border. However, the management of an international river basin is complicated by the broad range of stakeholders with various interests who shape and influence the flow of the river within the watercourse. (5−7) The differences in interests between riparian states, and even their subnational units, sometimes can lead to water-related conflicts in the basin. (8−10)
As a result of the adverse impacts of climate change and severe drought, the Helmand (also known as Hirmand) (11) River Basin is now one of the most significantly water-stressed basins in the world and has been the focus of disputes between its two riparians, upstream Afghanistan and downstream Iran. (12−14) Although a large number of scholars (14−29) have explored the challenges of cooperation between the two countries, almost no scholarship has explicitly explored the challenges of water cooperation between Afghanistan and Iran from the lens of trust and how the establishment of trust can help riparians manage and utilize a shared watercourse in a sustainable way.
Despite the existence of an internationally recognized water treaty on the Helmand River, (30) this paper explores how a lack of trust between Afghanistan and Iran has contributed to the intensification of water disputes between the two riparian states for almost half a century. The paper begins by presenting the historical and hydrological contexts of the basin. It then develops a theoretical framework followed by a methodology for building trust between the riparian states of a shared watercourse. The paper also analyzes and discusses the framework in the context of the Helmand River Basin. The final section offers some concluding remarks, including the suggestion that if both riparian nations do not enhance cooperation through trust building, the water conflict between Afghanistan and Iran will likely be severely aggravated.

2. Historical Context

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The Helmand River Basin is the largest river basin in southern Afghanistan. The lands along the Helmand River have been irrigated for more than 6000 years. (31,32) With a catchment area of 400 000 km2, the basin covers 40% of Afghanistan’s land area. (31) Mianabadi et al. (26) contend that almost 89% of the basin is located in Afghanistan, 9% in Iran, and 2% in Pakistan. Because Pakistan is not part of the Helmand River Treaty, it will be excluded from our discussion and analysis.
Originating in the Baba Mountains in central Afghanistan, the Helmand River travels more than 1300 km entering the Sistan Depression before discharging into semiconnected wetlands known as hamouns. (15,17,20) The basin provides livelihoods─mainly through irrigation, animal husbandry, and livestock─for >8 million residents in south and southwestern Afghanistan and >1 million people in Iran’s Sistan-Baluchistan province. (9,27,33) Thus, the basin is highly important for both nations as more than 90% of irrigation lands in southeastern Afghanistan and 80% of lands in Sistan-Baluchistan are irrigated by Helmand River flow. (34) However, climate change and human-induced drought have affected the flow of the Helmand. (35−37) As a result of water shortages due to climatic changes and water misallocations, (38,39) disputes over water have become significantly more frequent between the two riparian states. (9,13,40)
Water disputes between the two nations began in 1872 when Frederic Goldsmid, a British officer, drew the Afghan–Iranian political border along the Helmand River. (41) In 1948, to mediate the water conflict between the two riparians, the U.S. Department of State suggested the formation of an impartial commission run by three outside-basin experts, called the Helmand River Delta Commission. (13,18,41) The aim of the commission was to evaluate Iran’s water allocation from the Helmand River. After a year of research and investigation, the Helmand River Delta Commission presented their findings to both upstream and downstream riparians. (31,42) According to their findings, Iran’s water share from the Helmand River has been calculated at 22 m3 of water per second in a normal water year (Helmand River Delta Commission Report, 1951, p 95). (31) A normal water year is a year in which the flow of the Helmand River is at least 5.661 billion m3 of water from October 1 to September 30 of the following year as measured at the Dehrawud Station in the upper Kajaki Dam on the Helmand River in Afghanistan. (31,43−46) The findings of their investigation were rejected by Iran, which demanded a higher share of the Helmand River’s flow. (45,47)
To ease the water conflict with its downstream riparian, Afghanistan offered to provide Iran an additional 4 m3 of water per second [for a total of 26 m3 per second (see Table 1)] in a normal water year as a sign of brotherhood and good neighborliness. (43) In return, Iran offered Afghanistan a “financial payment” and free use of its Bandar Abbas port for importing and exporting goods (p 370). (48) This arrangement formed the basis of the Helmand River Treaty, which was signed in March 1973 by the prime ministers of Afghanistan and Iran, Musa Shafiq and Amir Abbas Hoveida, respectively. While the Iranian government ratified the treaty on July 17, 1973, (48) the Afghan government ratified it in June 1977. (18,48)
Table 1. Iran’s Share of Helmand River Water Based on the 1973 Helmand River Treaty
 distribution of the average flow of water in cubic meters per second based on 22 m3/s in accordance with the Helmand River Delta Commission Reportdistribution of the average flow of water in cubic meters per second based on 4 m3/s as an expression of Afghanistan’s goodwilldistribution of the average flow of water in cubic meters per second based on columns 2 and 3 of this table for an averaged total flow of 26 m3/s
October4.230.775.00
November10.751.9712.72
December19.483.5623.04
January29.355.3234.67
February66.1212.0478.16
March61.9011.2373.13
April26.304.8131.11
May7.641.399.03
June16.713.0219.73
July11.612.1113.72
August7.931.449.37
September1.980.342.32
According to the treaty, as detailed in Table 1, Iran’s total water right from the Helmand River in a normal water year is approximately 820 million m3 of water (820 000 000 m3/year). (24,42) Article IV of the treaty provides that in a low-flow year “due to climatic factors”, Iran’s water share will be adjusted on the basis of the flow of each month of the year. (46,49)
Soon after ratifying the Helmand River Treaty, Afghanistan was beset by social unrest and internal and external war. Some scholars (17,21,42) argue that during these four decades of turmoil, Iran took advantage of conditions in Afghanistan by developing a hydraulic mission─referring to the intensive construction of dams, reservoirs, irrigation canals, etc. (50)─in the lower part of the Helmand River. In fact, Hoominfar and Radel (51) claim that Iran has built more than 1300 small- and large-scale dams throughout the country, which would place Iran third in the world in terms of dam construction (p 4). They also argue that the construction of these dams resulted in a series of socio-environmental challenges in Iran and neighboring countries. (51) Abdulrahman (52) argues that Iran has built a number of dams on tributaries of the Lower Zab River. One of the recently constructed dams is Sardasht Dam located in West Azerbaijan near the political border of Iran and Iraq. The operation of Sardasht Dam has drastically impacted the flow of water to the Lower Zab River, depriving the Kurdistan region of Iraq from accessing water for domestic and agricultural use, as well as for ecosystem conservation and preservation. (52) In the context of the Helmand River, Nagheeby and Rieu-Clarke (11) contend that Afghan authorities blame Iran for allowing farmers to abstract water from the riverbanks of the Helmand River (the political border of Afghanistan and Iran) via installation of “hundreds of water pumps” (p 188). The illegal abstraction of water through these wells has introduced serious environmental challenges into the ecosystem and hamouns in the region. Moreover, Farshasaid and Khodarahmy (53) along with Raeisi et al. (54) argue that Iran has built at least three dams (Zahak, Sistan, and Kahak Dams) on the lower Helmand River to divert the natural flow of that river. Additionally, and without consulting its upstream neighbor, Iran built four Chahnimehs, artificial manmade reservoirs, with a total storage capacity of 2900 million cubic meters (MCM) of water (Figure 1). (53,55,56) While Iran claims that the purpose of the Chahnimehs is to hold water flowing from the upper Helmand River during flash floods, these reservoirs are actually used to divert the flow of Helmand River to supply drinking water for the people of Zabol and Zahedan, cities in Iran’s Sistan-Baluchistan province. (28,55,56)

Figure 1

Figure 1. Diversion of the Helmand River flow through the construction of four Chahnimehs.

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Prior to the construction of Chahnimehs, water at the end of the Helmand River flowed in a counterclockwise direction, first reaching Hamoun Puzak located almost entirely in Afghanistan and then flowing to Hamoun Saberi traversing the border of Afghanistan and Iran, then to Hamoun Helmand in Iran, and finally to the Gowd-i Zerah Depression in Afghanistan (Figure 2). (16,57,58) Now, with the diversion of the Helmand’s water to the Chahnimehs, the hamouns in the region have significantly dried up. Sala and Von Laffert (59) and Keynoush (60) argue that Iran used a similar unilateral approach, capturing water resources through dams and diversion canals (e.g., Daryan Dam, and a 150 km underground tunnel diverting the natural flow to rural areas in southeastern Iran), to deprive Iraqi residents of water access from the Lower Zab River. Thus, Takal, former Minister of Energy and Water of Afghanistan, contends that Iran is also largely responsible for the desiccation of Gowd-i Zerah due to the diversion of Helmand’s flow through the Chahnimehs. (56)

Figure 2

Figure 2. Natural flow of the Helmand River prior to the diversion of its flow to Iran’s Chahnimehs (Soar) (61) (used with permission).

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In contrast to Iran, the Afghan government started development of its hydraulic mission much later. Construction of Kamal Khan Dam, a hydroelectric and irrigation dam project, was started in 1974 but then delayed due to the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan. (18) It was not until 2011 that the first phase of the dam was kicked off by the Ministry of Energy and Water of Afghanistan (MEW) under Hamid Karzai’s administration. (62) According to Shaheer, (63) construction of Kamal Khan Dam was accelerated when the former President of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, expressed his concerns related to the free flow of the Helmand River to Iran. Thus, right after the completion of the first phase, the second phase of the dam was launched in 2012 and completed in early 2015. However, the third phase of the dam was delayed due to security concerns and eventually started in 2017 under Ashraf Ghani’s administration. (62) It is worth noting that the resumption of construction of the Kamal Khan Dam has intensified the tension in the basins between the two riparian states. (13,24−26,42,45)
While both nations stress the need for proper implementation of the treaty, Iran perceives the construction and inauguration of the dam as a threat to its national security. (64) In fact, the construction of Kamal Khan Dam invited serious criticism from Iranian officials, including the former President of Iran, Hassan Rouhani, and former and current Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Iran. Speaking at an international water and environmental conference, Rouhani criticized the resumption of the third phase of Kamal Khan Dam in Afghanistan, stressing that “we cannot remain indifferent to the issue [water dams] which is apparently damaging our environment”. He also added that the “construction of several dams in Afghanistan, such as Kajaki and Kamal Khan, affect our Khorasan and Sistan-Baluchistan provinces”. (65) Also, Mohammad Javad Zarif, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran, stated that the construction of Kamal Khan Dam has “severely” limited the flow of the Helmand River to the Sistan-Baluchistan region of Iran. (66) In response to their claims, the former spokesman to the MEW, Abdul Basir Azimi, stated that the construction of the dam will not only benefit Afghanistan but also regulate Iran’s water share from the Helmand River. He added that the completion of Kamal Khan Dam is a win-win for both riparian states and that “this way Iran will secure its rights and Afghanistan will manage the water and introduce organization into water usage” (p 6). (45)
Nevertheless, authorities in Iran blame the Afghan government for not complying with the Helmand River Treaty and accuse the upstream riparian of the desiccation of Hamoun Helmand as a result of Kamal Khan Dam. (67) Recently, Iranian scholar Kharazmi et al. (68) determined that Hamoun Helmand became desiccated long before the completion of Kamal Khan Dam. While the dam was inaugurated on March 24, 2021, (14,69) the Hamoun Helmand was already desiccated by 2000 (p 356). (68) Also, Jain (30) and Salehi (70) concluded that despite the inauguration of Kamal Khan Dam, farmers in Nimroz province, the province in which Kamal Khan Dam is located, still face a water crisis as the Afghan government has not yet constructed the related irrigation canals. Thus, in the absence of irrigation canals, the water continues to flow to Iran without restriction. (70)
In addition, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan under the Taliban’s administration recently released water from the Helmand River to the Sistan-Baluchistan region after water in the Kamal Khan reservoir reached its maximum level. (71) Hence, despite the existence of an international water treaty for the Helmand River, the basin continues to suffer from water disputes between the upstream and downstream riparian states (40,45,64,66) as a result of the adverse impacts of climate changes (p 2) (68) and water scarcity due to an increase in population and agricultural activity. (15,66)

3. Hydrological Assessment of the Basin

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3a. Surface Water Assessment

Between the 1950s and the late 1970s, a number of hydrometric gauging stations were installed in the Helmand River Basin in Afghanistan. Flow data and precipitation rates for this period have been digitized and are available through the U.S. Geological Survey. (72) However, the social unrest that plagued the country between 1980 and 2001, combined with the Soviet Union’s incursion in the country between 1979 and 1989, led to the destruction of many of those gauging stations. (73) Mahmoudi (74) and Rad et al. (75) argue that many of the stations were destroyed due to the conflict between Afghanistan and the Taliban, as well as natural hazards (e.g., flash flooding) and climatic changes. As a result, the significant lack of data has made water resource assessment in Afghanistan challenging, especially with regard to precipitation observations, which are used to calculate the Helmand River’s flow. (17,26)
After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) greatly contributed to the gathering of hydrological data in the basin, especially discharge rates from Kajaki Dam. (76) In addition, the Afghan Water Resources Department (WRD) in the MEW, the authorized institution for regulating the flow of water across the country, has repaired many of the gauging stations and begun collecting its own data during the past two decades. (73,77) Nevertheless, these efforts were severely affected by ongoing conflicts between the Afghan government and the Taliban, especially when the Taliban gained control of large portions of southern Afghanistan where the Helmand River flows. (12,77) In contrast, Shroder (42) and Goes et al. (17) contend that Iran, which is a more stable and powerful country than Afghanistan, was able to regularly monitor the flow of the Helmand River in the downstream region.
Despite persistent droughts in the basin, (66) Daly et al. (71) documented that the average annual precipitation in southern Afghanistan, including the Helmand River Basin, is <100 mm. Moreover, Goes et al. (17) calculated that between 1999 and 2012, the mean flow of the basin was roughly 5800 MCM. However, Thomas et al. (78) argue that the average flow of the Helmand River Basin was roughly 3500 MCM during the past decade (p 47). On the basis of the 1973 Helmand Water Treaty, Iran is entitled to 820 MCM in a normal water year. While Afghan scholars (18,28,29,79) argue that Iran has consistently received a share of water larger than its rightful water share based on the 1973 treaty, water scholars in Iran (26,44,69) claim that the Afghan government is not committed to ensuring Iran’s rightful share of the water from the Helmand River.
More recently, however, similar to the adverse effects of climate changes on other river basins, (80−83) the flow of the Helmand River Basin has also been impacted by climate changes, (66) especially between 2008 and 2021. (84) The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (85) has forecasted that the average temperature in the basin will reach 48 °C by the end of the 21st century, which will trigger faster melting of snowpack in the upper Helmand River Basin.

3b. Groundwater Assessment

There is very little information available about the groundwater resources of the Helmand River Basin. Groundwater is found in the unconsolidated valley sediments of the basin, including in local glacial deposits and alluvial and colluvium fills. (16) In the lower parts of the basin, there is a wide range of quaternary deposits through which water can be extracted from wells. Rainfall is the main source of groundwater recharge in the basin. (86,87) The average annual precipitation ranges from 50 mm in the southwest to 300 mm in the northwestern part of the basin. (76) Precipitation occurs in the winter when almost 70% falls in the form of snow. (17,76)
Approximately 80% of the population of the basin directly relies on agricultural production sustained by groundwater resources. The basin is predominantly rural, with the city of Kandahar as the only urban center. (13,14) An increasing population coupled with economic growth and dramatic climate changes has affected the flow of water throughout the basin, both groundwater and surface waters. (66,88) The aquifers underlying the region are highly important. However, the number, locations, quality, and other characteristics of the transboundary aquifers in the border region have not been identified by the riparian states. Similar to the Rio Grande Basin shared by the United States and Mexico and the treaty applicable to that transboundary river, (89,90) transboundary aquifers are excluded from the Helmand River Treaty. (17,18,43) The lack of financial support, the lack of reliable data, and the lack of technical expertise are the main challenges for identifying transboundary aquifers worldwide, (89,90) including in Afghanistan. (91) As a result of low annual rainfall and inadequate surface flows due to climate changes, (92) some scholars argue (93−95) that people in the basin heavily rely on the extraction of groundwater resources. Takal (56) and Hearns (43) believe that Iran has exploited and diverted the groundwater underlying the Helmand River through huge pumps and canals in the lower reach of the basin. Also, farmers in upstream Afghanistan have drilled deep wells to irrigate their crops without any restriction, and without any permits, (96) which resulted in the depletion of the region’s aquifers and the collapse of local ecosystems. (86,94,95) The main obstacle for sustainable groundwater use and management is the lack of accurate and reliable data on groundwater use and potential, as well as a lack of technical staff and financial means. (18,25,26)

4. Theoretical Framework

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Various disciplines of international relations have developed the notion of “trust” to assess the relationship between trust and cooperation. (97) While trust over transboundary water cooperation lacks a comprehensive theoretical framework, this paper constructs an analytical framework based on international relations literature.
International relations experts have defined trust from various points of view to study international relations. For instance, trust, as a widely accepted term in sociology, (98−102) is the willingness to take risk on behavior of others based on the fact that the trustee, e.g., a co-riparian of a shared watercourse, “will do what is right” (p 1). (98) Kydd defines trust as a “belief that the other side prefers mutual cooperation to exploiting one’s own cooperation, while mistrust is a belief that the other side prefers exploiting one’s cooperation to returning it” (p 6). (99) The maintenance of cooperation between riparians in a shared waterway is possible if the level of trust of each state exceeds a certain threshold related to the actor’s role, e.g., trust on data sharing. (103,104) In contrast, Wheeler and Booth (100) contend that trust can be maintained between two parties if the parities interpret their mutual attitude and behavior in a way in which one party does not harm the other party either now or in the future. Moreover, followers of the rational choice school of trust consider parties, in our case the riparian states of a shared watercourse, as self-interested and rational agents who make strategic decisions in the context of cooperation on a preferred resource. The rational choice theory (RCT) “assumes that trust is cognitive, and that cognition precedes trusting behavior” (p 3). (105) According to RCT, the trustor, one of the riparians in the case of the Helmand River, can foresee the level of trustworthiness of the other riparian in a shared river. (105) Similarly, Coleman (106) argues that a riparian state will trust the other riparian only if the probability of benefit minus the probability of loss is positive (gain – loss = positive outcome). In contrast, Wheeler (107) and Considine (108) perceive trust as a mix of feelings (emotions) and rational thinking.
While scholars have deeply explored the definition, origin, and consequences of trust in international relations, its importance in transboundary water cooperation has been underemphasized and undervalued. Hence, to develop a theoretical framework for building trust at the basin level, we need to explore why trust is important in fostering and maintaining cooperation between the co-riparian nations of a shared watercourse.
To establish trust between the riparian states of a shared watercourse, the following three propositions will be assessed (Figure 3).

Figure 3

Figure 3. Analytical framework for trust building between riparian states of the Helmand River Basin.

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4a. Honesty and Accountability

Honesty is the quality of being honest or being trustworthy. (104) At the interbasin scale, honesty affects trust through direct and indirect channels. Accountability, on the contrary, is the most significant factor of good governance. When it comes to the management of a shared watercourse, accountability points to the thorough engagement of stakeholders, e.g., the riparian nations of a basin, in managing the shared resources at the high level of performance. (109−111) Prior to the establishment of trust between two riparian nations, each riparian investigates and acquires trust information through direct and indirect channels. Through direct channels, each riparian state reviews the behavior of the other riparian and assesses whether the other riparian is trustworthy and accountable. (107,110,111) Once the investigating riparian has a better understanding of the other riparian, it will decide whether to trust it. Also, a riparian state can be informed about the trustworthiness of other co-riparians through indirect channels, such as from a neutral third party or institution, e.g., UN, World Bank, etc., that is responsible for evaluating and judging the international behavior of riparian nations of a shared river basin. Such parties or institutions can help a state decide whether a co-riparian is trustworthy. (110) Thus, maintaining honesty can reinforce trust among co-riparian states of an internationally shared river basin. (112)

4b. Transboundary Interest

When it comes to building trust, riparian states prefer their national security interests over transboundary interests, especially in water-stressed basins, e.g., Mekong River Basin, (113) Nile River Basin, (109) Indus River Basin, (110) and Helmand River Basin. (18,42,114) In other words, national interests are prioritized over transboundary (shared) interests in a shared watercourse in water-stressed countries. (115) If riparian states cooperate on the basis of their individual self-interests, their cooperative mechanism will collapse. (13,116) Thus, to build trust, riparian states must emphasize and pursue mutually beneficial interests, interests and benefits that all riparians can obtain equitably from the shared basin.

4c. Commitment to Cooperation

Once transboundary interests take precedence over national security interests, riparian states can then begin enhancing or fostering commitments for cooperation. This is the last stage in the effort to sustainably achieve and maintain trust among the riparian nations of a shared waterway. (117−120) This commitment could also be furthered through bilateral agreement about the sustainable utilization and management of a shared river basin. (121)

5. Methodology

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We have applied a desk study approach in which we explored the data from existing documents and previously published articles (secondary data). (42) We have chosen this method of research for analysis of the trust crisis in the Helmand River Basin because both riparian states of the Helmand River suffer from a lack of trust (mistrust) in the basin despite the fact that both nations signed an international treaty on managing and sharing the flow of the river in 1973. (46) While a large body of research investigated the challenges of water cooperation between the two states, none of the scholarship specifically explored trust as one of the main barriers to water cooperation between the two states. We, on the contrary, postulate that exploring the obstacles of trust between the upstream and downstream states will enable us to unpack why both nations have failed to establish trust between themselves and what mechanisms need to be implemented and adopted to establish and foster trust between these two countries on the flow of the Helmand River, a river that is vulnerable to climate changes and human activities. (17,18,29)
We will basically review scholarly publications, opinion pieces, reports, historical documents, news articles, and reports in Persian (the official spoken language in Iran), Pashto and Dari (official spoken languages in Afghanistan), and English to assess the challenges of trust building since the ratification of the treaty in 1973 and 1977 by Iran and Afghanistan, respectively. (48) We limit our research to the time frame of 1973–2023, as both nations agreed and signed a water sharing agreement on the flow of the Helmand River in 1973. We also trace opinion pieces and news reports because most Afghan scholars, given the limited hydro-cognizant capacity in Afghanistan (p 73), (18) and a small number of Iranian authorities share their practical experiences and views on the flow of the Helmand River through publishing in local newspapers. While it seems to be a limitation for this research, we argue that to maintain impartiality in scientific research, the views and perspectives of scholars and authorities of the two countries need to be thoroughly and comprehensively assessed and captured. To better understand the challenges of trust building between these two countries, we have proposed three factors, namely, dishonesty and unaccountability, national interest, and one-sidedness of the data sharing mechanism that prevents both nations from building trust in transboundary water cooperation on the flow of the Helmand River. These factors will be analyzed in Discussion. Finally, as the debate of challenges of trust (trust crises) on transboundary water cooperation among riparian states is unappreciated or is not well-explored, (115) we hope that this research will help scholars as well as policy makers to further unravel the challenges of trust building among riparian nations of shared watercourses.

6. Discussion

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6a. Honesty and Accountability: Does the Lack of Political Will Serve as an Obstacle to Accountability and Honesty?

As stated by Uprety, (122) much of the treaty-making behavior in south and central Asia suffers from mutual distrust among the states due to a lack of political will. Similar to that in the Ganges–Brahmaputra–Meghna (GBM) basin, (11) water in the Helmand River Basin is highly politicized as neither of the two riparian nations holds itself accountable for the overexploitation of the flow, both surface water and groundwater, of the basin. (11,18,22,123)
According to Malyar (124) and Thomas et al., (78) both countries have shirked their responsibilities in relation to the Helmand River Treaty instead of being committed to its fulfillment. For instance, according to Article III of the treaty, (46) Afghanistan is responsible for specifying and delivering Iran’s share of the water after measuring the flow at the Dehrawud hydrometric station in the upper portion of the Helmand River in Afghanistan on a monthly basis. However, that station was not fully operationalized until late 2021, (125) although, according to Thomas and Varzi, (13) the station, located in the upper Kajaki part of Dam, (126) was in operation for a short period of time (1973–1978) before the start of the social unrest and internal conflict that plagued Afghanistan beginning in the late 1970s (p 512). Instead, Afghanistan provided discharge data measured at Chila-e Charkh and Khabgah Station at the Afghan–Iranian border in the lower Helmand River Basin (see ref (74)). Furthermore, when the Iranian government demanded their rightful share of water from the Helmand River, especially during periods of drought, Afghan authorities claimed that the flow of the Helmand had declined due to climatic changes. (37) According to Nagheeby, (125) Iranian authorities “repeatedly” requested the opportunity to visit the station to verify Afghanistan’s measurements, but the Afghan authorities declined due to security concerns (p 188). More recently, following the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021, Jabbar Vatanfada, Director General of the Office of Border Rivers and Joint Water Resources of the Iranian Energy Ministry, (127) claimed that the Afghan authorities intentionally failed to reactivate the Dehrawud Station so that they could divert the Helmand River’s flow from Kamal Khan Dam to Gowd-i-Zerah Depression, located just inside of Afghanistan’s territory, and prevent the water from reaching the Afghan–Iranian border. (127) Thus, Nagheeby (125) argues that the Iranian authorities blame Afghanistan for failing to abide by its responsibilities regarding implementation of the Helmand River Treaty. However, in a recently published article, Faizee, (128) who served as an Afghan commissioner before the Taliban took control of the country, refuted Iran’s claim and stated that since March 2022, the Taliban have kept the gates of Kamal Khan reservoir open and allowed the river to flow downstream to Iran.
In addition, Afghan scholars, such as Hussaini and Azimi (28) and Mayar, (79) have accused Iran of being dishonest in its implementation of the treaty. According to Article IIIa of the treaty, (46) the commissioners of both riparian countries are accountable for specifying the three water delivery points near the Afghan–Iran political border after the treaty entered into force. (46) These water delivery points are (1) “at the place where the boundary line crosses the rude Seistan” and (2) “at two other places where the boundary line is located in the bed of the Helmand River between boundary pillars numbers 51 and 52” (also called markers 51 and 52) (43) (Article IIIa, pp 1–2).
However, Takal, (56) the former Minister of MEW of Afghanistan, argues that Iran has shirked its responsibility under the treaty by failing to work with Afghanistan to specify these delivery points. He explains that over the past two decades, the Afghan government consistently requested that the Iranian authorities jointly specify the three water delivery points mentioned above, but the Iranian authorities refused.
According to Thomas and Varzi (13) and Goes et al., (17) Iran’s rejection of cooperation is related to its growing demand for water in the Sistan-Baluchistan region. Thomas and Varzi believe that Iran’s current water right (820 MCM in a normal water year) represents only 14% of the water needs of Sistan-Baluchistan (p 510). (13) Takal (56) argues that Iran built the Gulmir 1, Gulmir 2, and Shirdel canals on the Iranian side of the Helmand River to divert water to nearby Iranian cities. Additionally, Hetoment (129) asserts that using a huge pipeline with a 40 in. diameter, “Iran illegally transfers 40 MCM of water─on annual basis─from Helmand River to Zahedan city, the center of Sistan-Baluchistan province which is a violation of the treaty” (p 1), resulting in the overexploitation of the Helmand River’s flow in the lower stretch of the river. (18,28,29,129) As Iran’s water needs have drastically increased in recent decades, (13,18) Iran has exploited water from more than the three points identified in the 1973 treaty, thus intentionally circumventing the terms of the agreement. (124)
In addition, Malyar, (124) former deputy minister for the National Environmental Protection Agency of Afghanistan, and Takal, (56) former Minister of MEW, contend that to address farmers’ water needs, Iran allowed its farmers to illegally dig more than 5,00 shallow wells and install hundreds of water pumps to extract groundwater and surface water from the Helmand River. In response, Iranian scholar Nagheeby (125) argues that Iran does not deny the existence of water pumps for the exploitation of the flow of Helmand River. However, he believes that the water abstraction through these wells is “negligible” compared to Iran’s water share from the Helmand River (p 188). However, if we assume that each farmer withdraws an average of 10 000 m3 of water per year, given that there are 5500 wells in Iran along the Helmand River, that will amount to 55 MCM. This is more than the amount of water that Iran transfers from the Helmand to Zahedan. However, according to Hajihosseini et al., farmers in the Middle Helmand Basin (MHB) in Afghanistan used more than 28 000 m3 of water per hectare per year in 2011 (pp 1695, 1705), (130) suggesting that Iranian farmers in the Lower Helmand Basin may use a similar amount.
While Nagheeby (125) suggests that the Iranian government has made numerous attempts to remove the water pumps but has been confronted with social resistance from the farmers in Sistan-Baluchistan, this cannot be an acceptable justification for failing to abide by treaty obligations. (124) Mahmoudi, (74) who has chaired Afghanistan’s commissioners committee for a decade and a half (2004–2018), asserted that political unwillingness in Iran is the main obstacle to holding Iran accountable to the implementation of the Helmand River Treaty. In line with his argument, Kazem (131) believes that Iran is not willing to remove the existing water pumps on its side of the river despite the fact that the Afghan commissioners have repeatedly made that request. Additionally, at their 18th meeting in 2017, Mahmoudi (74) contends that the Afghan commissioners warned the Iranian authorities that the official meetings could be discontinued if the Iranian government fails to remove the water pumps. In fact, the main agenda of their 18th joint meeting was the removal of the wells from the Iranian side of the Helmand River. While the meeting continued for two days, it ended without any results. (74) Thus, Shroder and Ahmadzai, (18) Hussaini and Azimi, (29) and Kazem (131) all believe that Iran has been dishonest in the proper implementation of the treaty.
On the contrary, Iranian scholars and authorities blame Afghanistan for failing to implement the Helmand River Treaty. For example, Nagheeby (69) believes that the current government under the Taliban administration is acting unlawfully with regard to Iran’s rightful share under the treaty. He argues that the Taliban has diverted the natural flow of the Helmand River from Kamal Khan Dam to the Gowd-i Zerah depression, which harms not only the residents of Iran’s Sistan-Baluchistan province but also the Afghan residents in the downstream section of the Helmand River. According to Iran Front Page, (132) an Iranian online news Web site licensed by the Iranian government, the Taliban’s administration lacks the political will to abide by the treaty. Nagheeby (69) also contends that the Taliban recently diverted 950 MCM of water from “its natural course of the river”, depriving downstream residents of the river and harming the Hamoun wetland ecosystem. In response to Nagheeby’s claim, Azam, (133) Senior Advisor to the Taliban’s MEW who also chaired the Afghan Commissioners on the 25th official meetings of Iran and Afghanistan in Tehran in June 2022, argues that Iran has received more than 2 times its water share based on the Helmand River.
Nagheeby (125) also asserts that Iran is concerned about the possibility of cheating with regard to Afghanistan’s flow measurements. He argues that because Dehrawud Station was not operational until late 2021, the calibration of instruments and data, as well as the measurements and analysis at Dehrawud Station, cannot be verified and, thus, is suspect. In fact, Nagheeby (125) doubts the veracity of the data measured by the Afghan authorities. He believes that the Afghan commissioners manipulated the discharge data to prove that climatic changes have severely affected the flow of the Helmand River and, thereby, justified reducing Iran’s entitlement from the Helmand River. Nagheeby reinforces his claim with the argument that Afghan commissioners have denied the Iranian request to visit Dehrwud Station for data verification (p 188). (125) Nagheeby’s claim (125) is also reinforced by Mianabadi et al., (25) who argue that climate change has only slightly affected the rainfall in the Helmand River Basin. They assert that there is “no significant reduction” in precipitation in the basin (p 3454), thus blaming the Afghan government for manipulating the flow data for the Helmand River, and thereby reducing the amount of water flowing to Iran. However, Mianabadi et al. acknowledge that their satellite-based data analysis lacks some important factors, e.g., snowmelt, infiltration, and the amount of water stored upstream in the Kajaki Dam reservoir (p 3459), (25) that directly affect the flow of the Helmand River Basin. Moreover, Afghan scholars, such as Alami and Tayfor (134) and Nazari et al., (93) offer evidence that the flow of the Helmand River has declined substantially in recent decades. While Alami and Tayfor (134) argue that the lack of precipitation was the main cause of drought in the basin between 1997 and 2002 (p 743), Nazari et al. (93) believe that population growth, irrigation expansion─especially in western and southwestern parts of the basin─and climate change are the main factors contributing to the decline of the Helmand River’s flow between 2003 and 2021 (p 10). In addition, some Iranian scholars such as Hajihosseini et al. (130) acknowledge that climatic changes affected the temperature in the basin, which caused evapotranspiration in the basin to increase from 5690 to 7320 m3 per hectare per year from 1985 to 2012 (p 1709).
In summary, accusations of dishonesty and a lack of accountability have been widely made by authorities and officials from both parties, especially during the past 26 official meetings of the commisioners, (25,26,69,124,125) as well as by scholars from both countries. (22−26,28−30,40) We, however, argue that honesty and accountability, which are the first stages in developing trust between the riparian nations of a shared watercourse, could be achieved in the Helmand River Basin if both countries complied with the existing treaty (135) by specifying the three points of water delivery at the political border of Afghanistan and Iran, as well as by weatherizing and upgrading the monitoring technology at the Dehrawud Station.

6b. National Security Interests Overcoming Transboundary Interests: A Challenge to Building Trust

Access to water in the water-stressed Helmand River Basin is tied to the national security of both Afghanistan and Iran. (114,123) Ahmadzai (136) explains that in Afghanistan, decisions related to the country’s transboundary waters need the approval of the National Security Council headed by the President of Afghanistan (p 406), which is now in the hands of the Taliban’s ministerial cabinet. He asserts that the lack of dialogue on transboundary water between Afghanistan and Iran is due to a lack of political will and political power in the Afghan government, currently the Taliban administration, (128,137) triggered by poor technical knowledge and significant mistrust between the riparian states of the Helmand River (p 406). (18) These factors highlight how the flow of the Helmand River is tied to the national security interests of Afghanistan, which is concerned about water scarcity and its overall water security in the face of changing climatic conditions. (128)
While some scholars in Afghanistan, e.g., Shroder and Ahmadzai (18) and Hussaini and Azimi, (28) perceive the 1973 Helmand River Treaty as a masterpiece in Afghanistan’s history of hydro-diplomacy, past governments, especially those backed by the USSR, have accused Musa Shafiq, Afghanistan’s prime minister who signed the 1973 Helmand River Treaty, of betraying Afghanistan. As water is considered to be a critical national interest of Afghanistan, following the ratification of the treaty by the Afghan government in 1977, (18,48) Musa Shafiq was arrested by the Communist Party, in power at the time, and was assassinated the following year in Pul-e-Charkhi Prison in Kabul. (124) The Communist Party blamed him for giving away Afghanistan’s water for free to benefit Iran. (124) It clearly points to the importance of water in Afghanistan and how water, especially in the Helmand River Basin, serves as a challenge to building trust between the riparian countries.
Similar to the case in Afghanistan, water serves as a national interest of Iran. In fact, Iranians historically perceive the Sistan region (Nimruz province in Afghanistan and Sistan-Baluchistan province in Iran, both of which lie in the lower Helmand River Basin) as part of Greater Persia. (18,49) For instance, Dabiri, (49) a former Iranian diplomat, accuses General Goldsmid of arbitrating against Iran regarding the Sistan region. Shroder (16) argues that the political turmoil in Afghanistan began in 1863 after the death of Dost Mohammad Khan, the king of Afghanistan. Using the political turmoil in Afghanistan, the Persians conquered 440 km of Afghanistan’s territory along the Helmand River. When Sher Ali Khan, the son of Dost Mohammad Khan, came to power in 1868, his weak and fragile government was unable to fight with Iran over the already occupied territory (p 291). To solve the border problem, Sher Ali Khan solicited the British government for arbitration. Shroder and Ahmadzai (18) documented that the British government tasked four British officers under the command of General Frederic John Goldsmid to visit the region and draw the political boundaries between the two countries along the Helmand River. Looking at the map of the two countries, Shroder (16) argues that a large portion of Sistan, also called “Sistan Proper” with an area of more than 69 700 mi2 (roughly 80% of Sistan region), on the west bank of the Helmand River was awarded to Iran, (138) whereas the “outer Sistan”, with an area of 16 600 mi2 (roughly 20% of Sistan region), on the eastern bank of the river was awarded to Afghanistan (p 291). (16) Dabiri believes that the Sistan region should have completely been made a part of Iran. Because four-fifths of the Sistan region is located inside of Iran, (138) he also asserts that a larger volume of the Helmand River flow should have been allocated to Iran. (49)
As the water level in the Helmand River declined in the basin in recent years due to climatic changes and overabstraction by both riparian nations, (37,95,124) people in Sistan-Baluchistan province in Iran started to protest. (139) According to Lalzoy, (140) they demanded more water from the Helmand River and even attacked and damaged the trucks of Afghan traders. In response, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, Speaker of the Parliament of Iran, stated that the legislative, judicial, and executive powers in Iran recognized water as a critical national security interest and that Iran faced chronic water shortages and ecosystem degradation. (114,123) He also added that the nation’s freshwater resources, especially transboundary waters, should be prioritized given the dramatic decline in precipitation due to climatic changes and the rapid growth in population in the lower Helmand River Basin. (13,114)
Water in the Helmand River Basin as a priority national interest for both Afghanistan and Iran outpaces water as a transboundary (common) interest because each riparian uses water exclusively for their own economic and political interests and purposes. (18) For instance, Hoominfar and Radel (54) and Ali et al. (141) contend that Iran has used the water in an effort to become self-sufficient in agricultural productivity and food security. To reach that level of self-sufficiency, Iran has expanded farm lands across the Sistan region and diverted the natural flow of the Helmand River into four Chahnimehs. (75) Using traditional and outdated irrigation practices in the lower part of the Helmand River Basin, Iran not only triggered the desiccation of the hamouns (142−146) but also led to socio-economic disaster, the migration of rural communities to urban areas (p 2), (51) in the lower reach of the basin. (18) In contrast, as explained by Dudley, (137) Afghanistan has used water for hydropower generation and agricultural production in the basin. To address its hydropower and agricultural needs, Hakimi (147) reports that Afghanistan inaugurated Kamal Khan Dam and recently increased the capacity of Kajaki Dam to generate >100 MW of hydroelectricity to the residents of southern Afghanistan. Thus, as stated by Susskind and Islam (148) and Jackson, (149) in a shared watercourse prioritizing national interests over transboundary (common) interests leads to a perspective in which a zero-sum outcome is the only possible result, in which one riparian is the “absolute winner” and the other riparian(s) is the loser(s). As has occurred in the Mekong River Basin, (150) this type of mindset challenges trust building between the riparian nations of the shared Helmand River. (9,16,18)
However, we postulate that if the riparian nations of the Helmand River revisit their interests and prioritize transboundary (common) interests over their national security interests, both neighboring countries will benefit from a positive-sum game of benefit sharing. A number of scholars also suggest that the “benefit sharing approach” could be used as a tool to build trust between the riparian nations of a shared waterway. (151−153) In fact, the concept of benefit sharing urges riparian states “not to seek to share the water itself” but rather to share the different benefits that can be derived from sharing the water (p 126). (150) Scholars such as Biswas (154) and Klaphake (155) argue that by moving from the concept of sharing water, the quantity of water in a shared waterway, to the sharing of the benefits, riparian nations can easily replace the zero-sum concept of water sharing with the positive-sum concept of benefit sharing. Sadoff and Gray (153) assert that the adoption of a positive-sum approach in a shared waterway will lead to the establishment of trust between the neighboring states of an internationally shared watercourse. In line with their postulations, Lee (150) considers benefit sharing as a “political tool” that can be used to enhance and maintain trust between riparian nations (p 140).
The benefit sharing approach also could trigger the riparian states of the Helmand River to adopt multilateral cooperative relations. As both nations are socio-economically interdependent, (125) both will benefit from the shared watercourse if they prioritize common interests over their national security interests. (18) For instance, one common interest could be the energy-related benefit in the basin. Currently, Afghanistan imports >22% of its energy from Iran. (156) Thus, we argue that Afghanistan may be able to use water as a trade-off for energy with Iran. This approach is reinforced by the statement of the former president of Afghanistan, Mohammad Ashraf Ghani, made during the inauguration of Kamal Khan Dam in 2021, that Iran can receive more water in exchange for oil. (157)
A second common interest pertains to security-related benefits. Both countries suffer from human trafficking and terrorism in the Sistan region. Chuen (158) believes that Nimruz province in the area of the Helmand River is a major center for human traffickers. He asserts that thousands of people are smuggled annually to Europe through this area. In fact, the presence of human traffickers poses a significant threat not only for Afghanistan but also for Iran. (158) The illegal immigration of Afghans through Nimruz province has negatively affected the socio-economic condition of Iran especially after the fall of the Afghan government in August 2021. (159) According to Arab Weekly, (160) due to the massive illegal immigration of Afghan people to Iran, the unemployment rate in Iran increased by 22% and the Rial, Iran’s currency, depreciated by 50%. Moreover, Iran has voiced concerns about terrorism in connection with the porous and poorly guarded border. (159)
Other common interests shared by the two countries that may be furthered by a benefit sharing approach could include economics, transportation, and social, cultural, and political priorities. Therefore, prioritizing transboundary interests over individual national interests in the Helmand River Basin will help build and maintain trust between the two neighboring states. (25)

6c. Sharing Data or Exchanging Data: Who Blames Whom for a Lack of Commitment to Cooperation?

Data and information exchange is the foundation for building long-term trust between the riparian states of a shared watercourse. (4) Thomas and Varzi (13) assert that while Article II of Protocol I of the Helmand River Treaty suggests assigning a commissioner and deputy commissioner from both parties to oversee and ensure the proper implementation of the treaty, the functionality of the joint committee is like a “dialogue of the deaf”. Iran believes that, on the basis of their data, it has not received its full water share from the Helmand River. In contrast, Afghanistan argues that, on the basis of their data, Iran has received more water than it is entitled to under the treaty (p 512).
Thomas et al. (78) assert that the 1973 treaty lacks a two-sided data exchange approach that would obligate both riparians to commit to cooperation through reliable data exchange. This argument may be valid for the data generated at Dehrawud Station. While the treaty does not specify who is responsible for generating the flow measurements at this station, (69) it is reasonable to presume that data generation at Dehrawud should be entirely the responsibility of Afghanistan because the station is located fully within Afghanistan’s territory. As a matter of practice, Afghanistan has always produced the data at this station on its own and then shared a hard copy of the information with its downstream neighbor. (18,33,74)
The argument, however, does not apply to the data that should be produced at the three points of water delivery specified in Article IIIa, namely at Sistan Rud and two other locations (markers 51 and 52) (43) that the parties are supposed to identify. According to Article VI of Protocol I of the treaty, the commissioners from both sides “shall act jointly in the measurement and delivery of the water at the places of delivery specified in Article III of the Treaty”. (46) Thus, it is logical to infer that both nations must share the discharge data generated at these three delivery points. Otherwise, it would be impossible to “jointly” measure and deliver the appropriate volume of water due to Iran. Moreover, Article IIIb of the treaty obliges the parties to “build suitable joint structures and install necessary devices at the places mentioned in paragraph (a) of this Article, so that the amounts of water specified in the Articles of this Treaty may be measured and delivered effectively and accurately in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty”. (46) Again, this provision suggests that both Afghanistan and Iran have an obligation to cooperate in the development and exchange of data generated at the three points of delivery. This interpretation is supported by Thomas and Varzi, who assert that ensuring the proper implementation of the treaty requires that the commissioners of both countries measure and monitor the flow of water “entering Iran at different points, including at the head of the Sistan River” (p 512). (13)
Despite these clear obligations, both nations failed to commit to the exchange of reliable data and information. (25,26) Rad et al. argue that both countries lack reliable historical hydrological data on the flow of the Helmand River and that the absence of such data has greatly hindered water cooperation between the two countries. (75) Their argument is reinforced by the findings of Carius et al. (161) and Evers et al., (162) who assert that there is a direct relationship between the presence of reliable data and a commitment to cooperate. Evers et al. (162) believe that, in developing countries, e.g., Afghanistan and Iran, the difference in interpreting and legitimizing poorly generated data can lead to mistrust and, thus, can hamper commitments to cooperate among riparian nations (p 2). On the Afghan side, the Dehrawud Station was not functioning until late 2021, (133) although the station, according to Thomas and Varzi, (13) was in operation for a short period of time (1973–1978) before the start of social unrest and internal conflict in Afghanistan (p 512). Some Afghan scholars claim that security was the main challenge to the reactivation of the station especially during the past two decades (2001–2021). (18,28,74,124) In addition, as noted above, Iran claims that Afghanistan had never been committed to the 1973 treaty and recently intentionally delayed making Dehrawud Station operational to divert water from the Helmand and use it in the area of Gowd-i-Zerah. (127,163)
On the Iranian side, Iranian scholars such as Hajihosseini et al. (19) and Mianabadi et al., (26) as well as Thomas and Varzi (13) argue that Iran has been disinterested in exchanging its data with Afghanistan. According to Thomas and Varzi, (13) Iran has never wanted to build the three hydrometric stations referenced in the treaty to measure the flow of water entering Iran because it realized that withdrawals at those locations would not meet its water needs. Scholars such as Goes et al. (17) and Shroder and Ahmadzai (18) believe that if Iran had participated in building the hydrometric stations and measured the flows in the lower Helmand River Basin, Afghanistan would have had the evidence to challenge Iran’s additional extraction point, including the thousands of wells that it has installed along the Helman River on its side of the border. (124) Thus, a lack of commitment for data cooperation has prevented Iran from engaging with Afghanistan in the construction of those stations.
Finally, as both riparian nations disagree on data collection and sharing processes under the treaty and raise concerns about uncertainty prevalent in the measured data, King and Sturtewagen (164) critiqued the water allocation between the riparian states of the Helmand River based on the 1973 treaty. They argue that “the absolute character of the stipulated allocation, as opposed to a percentage basis, appears to be the key flaw in the agreement as it stands” (p 7). In line with their assertion, Akbari and Haghighi (165) noted that in data-scarce basins such as the Helmand River, where the main cause for the lack of commitment to cooperate between the two countries is the scarcity of reliable data due to an inoperative hydrometric station, (16,25) water conflict will likely prevail over water cooperation. (165)
For building and maintaining trust between the upstream and downstream states of the Helmand River Basin, both countries are obliged under Article III of the 1973 Helmand River Treaty to jointly build hydrometric stations at the three points of water delivery. Likewise, they are both obliged to measure and ensure the proper delivery of Iran’s rightful entitlement. (46,78) As a result, both nations are required to regularly share data on the Helmand River’s flow, at least with regard to data that should be generated at these three hydrometric stations.

7. Conclusion

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Building trust is the foundation for lasting and reliable cooperation between the riparian states of a shared river basin. This research aimed to analyze the challenges of trust between the upstream and downstream riparian states of the Helmand River Basin. Using a desk study approach, we have developed a theoretical framework for the Helmand River basin. We proposed that the three components─honesty and accountability, transboundary interest, and commitment to cooperation─are the foundations for building trust between the two riparian states.
First, we explained that both nations have been unsuccessful in implementing the treaty despite having signed and ratified it almost a half-century ago. While the treaty holds both nations responsible for measuring and monitoring the flow of water at the three points of water delivery through the construction of joint structures near the political border of Afghanistan and Iran along the Helmand River, neither Afghanistan nor Iran was honest and accountable for the proper implementation of these provisions. It was also demonstrated that until 2021, the Afghan government failed to reconstruct and reactivate (13) the Dehrawud Station despite the presence of massive financial and security support by international counterparts between 2001 and 2021. Iran, on the contrary, has also evaded its responsibility for implementing the treaty. The historical research indicates that Iran is disinterested in specifying the three points of water delivery, in part because its current water needs have significantly increased. To address those growing needs, Iran is now withdrawing water from more than three locations, thus exceeding its rights under Article IIIa of the Helmand River Treaty. In fact, both nations appear to have violated the Helmand River Treaty. Thus, we believe that Afghanistan is responsible for maintaining and improving the technology and physical structure of the Dehrawud Station, (13,74) as the station is prone to natural and climatic hazards as well as conflict, (13,17,74) for assessing the normal water year and both countries are also obliged to jointly specify the three points of water delivery along the Helmand River near their political border and to measure and ensure the proper implementation of the treaty.
Second, it was documented that for both Afghanistan and Iran, national security interests outpace transboundary (common or shared) interests related to the Helmand River. In fact, water serves as a national security interest for both nations as both states use water for various purposes that are critical to their economies. Considering water as a national interest priority creates challenges for building trust between Afghanistan and Iran. Hence, we postulated that if transboundary interests were to be prioritized over national security interests, both nations would benefit from emphasizing their common interest in the basin over their national interests and by focusing on benefit sharing between the two countries.
Third, it was also argued that neither nation is committed to cooperation through data sharing even though the 1973 Helmand River Treaty obliges them to jointly measure, monitor, and share the discharge data on the Helmand River’s flow. In practice, the actual data sharing process between the two countries is one-sided in that only Afghanistan has shared discharge data with Iran; Iran has never shared any data related to the Helmand River with Afghanistan. The consequence is severe distrust between the riparian countries of the Helmand River Basin. Thus, we argue that to build a lasting and sustainable trust relationship between the two nations, both Afghanistan and Iran should act as responsible riparians and commit themselves to cooperate through meaningful data sharing.

Author Information

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  • Corresponding Author
  • Authors
    • Gabriel Eckstein - Texas A&M University School of Law, Fort Worth, Texas 76102, United States
    • Vijay P. Singh - Department of Biological and Agricultural Engineering and Zachry Department of Civil & Environmental Engineering, Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas 77843, United States
    • Rosario Sanchez - Texas Water Resources Institute, Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas 77843, United States
  • Author Contributions

    N.L.: conceptualization (supporting), investigation (lead), data curation, methodology, writing of the original draft (lead), and review, editing, and revising (supporting). G.E.: supervision, investigation (co-lead), project administration, critiquing, reviewing, and editing (supporting). V.P.S.: supervision, commenting, and reviewing. R.S.: supervision, methodology (support), and reviewing. CRediT: Najibullah Loodin conceptualization (lead), data curation (lead), formal analysis (lead), methodology (lead), writing-original draft (lead), writing-review & editing (equal); Gabriel Eckstein supervision (lead), validation (equal), writing-original draft (equal), writing-review & editing (equal); Vijay P. Singh supervision (lead), validation (equal), writing-original draft (equal), writing-review & editing (equal); Rosario Sanchez supervision (lead), validation (equal), writing-original draft (equal), writing-review & editing (equal).

  • Notes
    The authors declare no competing financial interest.

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    Inland lakes face unprecedented pressures from climatic and anthropogenic stresses, causing their recession and desiccation globally. Climate change is increasingly blamed for such environmental degrdn., but in many regions, direct anthropogenic pressures compd., and sometimes supersede, climatic factors. This study examd. a human-environmental system - the terminal Hamun Lakes on the Iran-Afghanistan border - that embodies amplified challenges of inland waters. Satellite and climatic data from 1984 to 2019 were fused, which documented that the Hamun Lakes lost 89% of their surface area between 1999 and 2001 (3809 km2 vs. 410 km2), coincident with a basin-wide, multi-year meteorol. drought. The lakes continued to shrink afterwards and desiccated in 2012, despite the above-av. pptn. in the upstream basin. Rapid growth in irrigated agricultural lands occurred in upstream Afghanistan in the recent decade, consuming water that otherwise would have fed the Hamun Lakes. Compounding upstream anthropogenic stressors, Iran began storing flood water that would have otherwise drained to the lakes, for urban and agricultural consumption in 2009. Results from a deep Learning model of Hamun Lakes' dynamics indicate that the av. lakes' surface area from 2010 to 2019 would have been 2.5 times larger without increasing anthropogenic stresses across the basin. The Hamun Lakes' desiccation had major socio-environmental consequences, including loss of livelihood, out-migration, dust-storms, and loss of important species in the region.
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  1. Asadullah Hanif, Barat Ali Khakpoor, Omid Ali Kharazmi, Najibullah Loodin. Participation in Practice in Community-Driven Development Projects in Afghanistan: A Case Study of Herat City. Global Social Welfare 2023, 8 https://doi.org/10.1007/s40609-023-00301-x
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    Figure 1. Diversion of the Helmand River flow through the construction of four Chahnimehs.

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    Figure 2

    Figure 2. Natural flow of the Helmand River prior to the diversion of its flow to Iran’s Chahnimehs (Soar) (61) (used with permission).

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    Figure 3

    Figure 3. Analytical framework for trust building between riparian states of the Helmand River Basin.

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      Evers, S.; Yule, C. M.; Padfield, R.; O’Reilly, P.; Varkkey, H. Keep wetlands wet: the myth of sustainable development of tropical peatlands-implications for policies and management. Global Change Biology 2017, 23 (2), 534– 549,  DOI: 10.1111/gcb.13422
      162
      Keep wetlands wet: the myth of sustainable development of tropical peatlands - implications for policies and management
      Evers Stephanie; Evers Stephanie; Yule Catherine M; Padfield Rory; O'Reilly Patrick; Varkkey Helena; Evers Stephanie; Yule Catherine M; Padfield Rory; Padfield Rory; O'Reilly Patrick; O'Reilly Patrick; Varkkey Helena
      Global change biology (2017), 23 (2), 534-549 ISSN:.
      Pristine tropical peat swamp forests (PSFs) represent a unique wetland ecosystem of distinctive hydrology which support unique biodiversity and globally significant stores of soil carbon. Yet in Indonesia and Malaysia, home to 56% of the world's tropical peatland, they are subject to considerable developmental pressures, including widespread drainage to support agricultural needs. In this article, we review the ecology behind the functioning and ecosystem services provided by PSFs, with a particular focus on hydrological processes as well as the role of the forest itself in maintaining those services. Drawing on this, we review the suitability of current policy frameworks and consider the efficacy of their implementation. We suggest that policies in Malaysia and Indonesia are often based around the narrative of oil palm and other major monocrops as drivers of prosperity and development. However, we also argue that this narrative is also being supported by a priori claims concerning the possibility of sustainability of peat swamp exploitation via drainage-based agriculture through the adherence to best management practices. We discuss how this limits their efficacy, uptake and the political will towards enforcement. Further, we consider how both narratives (prosperity and sustainability) clearly exclude important considerations concerning the ecosystem value of tropical PSFs which are dependent on their unimpacted hydrology. Current research clearly shows that the actual debate should be focused not on how to develop drainage-based plantations sustainably, but on whether the sustainable conversion to drainage-based systems is possible at all.
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